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Definitions of addiction have never been more hotly contested. The advance of 
neuroscientific accounts has not only placed into public awareness a highly controversial 
explanatory approach, it has also shed new light on the absence of agreement among the 
many experts who contest it. Proponents argue that calling addiction a ‘brain disease’ is 
important because it is destigmatising. Many critics of the neuroscientific approach also 
agree on this point. Considered from the point of view of the sociology of health and illness, 
the idea that labelling something a disease will alleviate stigma is a surprising one. Disease, 
as demonstrated in that field of research, is routinely stigmatised. In this article we take up 
the issue of stigma as it plays out in relation to addiction, seeking to clarify and challenge the 
claims made about the progress associated with disease models. To do so, we draw on 
Erving Goffman’s classic work on stigma, reconsidering it in light of more recent, process 
oriented, theoretical resources, and posing stigmatisation as a performative biopolitical 
process. Analysing recently collected interviews conducted with 60 people in Australia who 
consider themselves to have an alcohol or other drug addiction, dependence or habit, we 
explore their accounts of stigma, finding experiences of stigma to be common, multiple and 
strikingly diverse. We argue that by treating stigma as politically productive – as a contingent 
biopolitically performative process rather than as a stable marker of some kind of anterior 
difference – we can better understand what it achieves. In turn this allows us to consider not 
simply how the ‘disease’ of addiction can be destigmatised, or even whether the ‘diseasing’ 
of addiction is itself stigmatising (although this would seem a key question), but whether the 
very problematisation of ‘addiction’ in the first place constitutes a stigma process. 
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Definitions of addiction have never been more hotly contested. The advance of 
neuroscientific accounts has not only placed into public awareness a highly controversial 
explanatory approach, it has also shed new light on the absence of agreement among the 
many experts who contest it. Key neuroscience proponent Nora Volkow (Director of NIDA) 
argues that the approach allows us to understand that addiction is a ‘brain disease’ and that 
this disease approach is important because it is destigmatising. The conviction that disease 
labels destigmatise addiction is also evident among many of NIDA’s critics, although the 
disease models they use do not emphasise the ‘brain’ in the same way. Considered from the 
point of view of the sociology of health and illness, the idea that labelling something a 
disease will alleviate stigma is a surprising one. Disease, as demonstrated in that field of 
research, is routinely stigmatised (see, for example, Jutel, 2011, for stigma and medical 
diagnosis). In this article we take up the issue of stigma as it plays out in relation to 
addiction, seeking to clarify and challenge the claims made about the progress associated 
with disease models. To do so, we revisit the conceptual terrain established in Goffman’s 
classic work on stigma, reconsidering it in light of more recent, process oriented, theoretical 
resources, and posing stigmatisation as a performative biopolitical process. Analysing 
recently collected interviews conducted with 60 people in Australia who consider themselves 
to have an alcohol or other drug addiction, dependence or habit, we explore their accounts 
of stigma, finding experiences of stigma to be common, multiple and strikingly diverse. 
Stigma, it seems, emerges in and through countless activities, relationships and 
circumstances and plays out in an almost infinite range of ways. This reach and ubiquity 
invites analysis, especially from the point of view of process given its constant presence. 
What are the operations of addiction stigma in these instances? What, since it is hardly rare, 
does it achieve politically? Taking the accounts together, what does it say about drug use 
per se in Western liberal democratic settings? By treating stigma as politically productive – 
as a contingent biopolitically performative process rather than as a stable marker of some 
kind of anterior difference – we can better understand what it achieves. In turn this allows us 
to consider not simply how the ‘disease’ of addiction can be destigmatised, or even whether 
the ‘diseasing’ of addiction is itself stigmatising (although this would seem a key question), 
but whether the very problematisation of ‘addiction’ in the first place constitutes a stigma 
process – a process that for specific biopolitical reasons in need of further, ongoing, 






Definitions of addiction and views on the best ways to respond to it have varied significantly 
over time, and remain multiple and contested. The social science literature on the history 
and contemporary trajectory of the concept is extensive and has diversified over time to 
acknowledge the rather different articulations of addiction that occur depending upon the 
substance under discussion, other issues such as race and gender, and political and cultural 
variation across time and place (including variations in terminology such as ‘dependence’, 
‘substance use disorder’ and so on) (see Fraser, Moore and Keane, 2014 for a detailed 
discussion of this history). The most influential form taken by the idea of addiction recently is 
that offered by neuroscience. While social and cultural factors are sometimes acknowledged 
within neuroscientific approaches as contributing to addiction (Fraser, 2013), the ‘brain 
reward system’ is their main focus. According to NIDA scientists Volkow and Li (2004, 
p.163), addiction is ‘the neurobiology of behaviour gone awry’. As Volkow (2015) explains in 
a speech entitled ‘Addiction: A disease of free will’,  
If we embrace the concept of addiction as a chronic disease where drugs have 
disrupted the most fundamental circuits that enable us to do something that we take 
for granted—make a decision and follow it through—we will be able to decrease the 
stigma, not just in the lay public, but in the health care system, among providers and 
insurers.  
However, the benefits of the brain disease model have also been questioned. As Rose and 
Abi-Rached (2014) point out about neuroscience in general, the promise that it would 
revolutionise medicine has so far failed to materialise. Courtwright (2010) makes a similar 
observation about its approach to addiction, stating that the view that neuroscience would 
destigmatise drug use and challenge prohibitionist drug policy is not proving correct. It is 
becoming evident that labelling addiction a brain disease and then attempting to ‘educate’ 
the public about this disease is not producing any consistent change in stigmatising 
perspectives (see, for example, Meurk et al. [2014] for attitudes research on the brain 
disease model of addiction).1 Indeed, while some may consider Volkow’s intervention 
motivated by a desire to replace a more severe stigma (criminalisation) with a less severe 
one (pathologisation), this hierarchy of severity too is questionable. In this article we 
consider these issues of stigma as they relate to addiction. While our data do not allow an 
extended examination of the neuroscientific approach and its reception, we situate our 
analysis in its claims about the destigmatising potential of the brain disease model because 
it represents the principal (highly influential) mode in which more general assertions about 
the benefits of pathologisation are currently articulated. In turn this allows us to ask bigger 
questions about stigma and its operations. In our analysis we explore the many 
manifestations of stigma described by our interview participants, thinking through the political 
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operations of stigma more closely than is customary in this field. Finally, we speculate on the 




Research that takes in experiences and practices of stigma in relation to drug use is 
extensive and diverse. Along with differences in disciplinary and methodological approaches, 
there are differences in scale and specificity. In this latter respect the literature takes two 
main forms (although see, for example, Room, 2005). One form comprises highly specific 
studies on stigmatising practices in particular settings such as drug treatment services, 
hospitals and workplaces, on how individuals cope with stigma, and meta-analyses of these 
bodies of work (Barratt, 2011; Cama et al., 2016; Hathaway, 2011; Keyes et al., 2010; 
Kulesza et al., 2013; Livingston et al., 2011; Luoma et al., 2007; Radcliffe and Stevens, 
2008; Rivera et al., 2014, Simmonds and Coomber, 2009; Treloar and Holt, 2006). This work 
explores and documents experiences of stigma, and the operations of stigmatising 
perspectives, and considers the impact of stigma on individuals as well as ways of tackling it. 
Much of the work is based in broadly psychological or social psychological approaches that 
tend to attend most closely to the individual or local level, tracking intra-psychic and local 
dynamics and effects.  
 
The second form comprises broader research projects that incorporate into their analyses 
the operations of power, marginalisation and inequality in the lives of consumers of drugs. 
This work offers important, often highly nuanced and contextualised, insights into lives and 
settings inflected by forces largely inseparable from stigma (e.g. discrimination and 
exclusion). Ethnographic studies of communities, treatment services and drug markets are 
excellent examples of this (Bourgois, 2003; 2011; Carr, 2010; Dwyer, 2011; Dwyer and 
Moore, 2010; Raikhel, 2016; Weinberg, 2005), along with sociological studies of drug-related 
issues and settings (Fraser and valentine, 2008; Fraser and Seear, 2011; Pennay and 
Moore, 2010; Race, 2008; Rhodes et al., 2007). This body of work is often driven by an 
explicit awareness of the operations of power and inequality that form the basis for stigma 
and discrimination, illuminating the political terrain on which individuals are obliged to act 
and prompting questions about the scale on which change is required if lasting 
improvements in the standing of people who use drugs are to be achieved. Illuminating the 
diverse forms of disadvantage and discrimination people who use drugs experience, it 
analyses the role of gender, race, economic status, neighbourhood, sexuality and many 
other dimensions in these experiences. Taken together, these two bodies of research draw 




Alongside this work it is useful to consider the small body of other publications that analyse 
related health issues in ways that frame stigma differently, attending more searchingly to its 
specific relationship to power. Parker and Aggleton’s (2003) article on stigma and HIV is an 
exemplar here in that it uses Foucault’s work to embed stigma more clearly than is often the 
case in the production of power. As they put it (2003: 17), stigma is ‘central to the 
establishment and maintenance of the social order’. This work goes some way towards 
bringing into focus the need to see stigma not merely as a side effect of misconceptions or of 
individual proclivities towards aggressive exclusionary judgmentalism. The authors argue 
instead that,  
stigma is deployed by concrete and identifiable social actors seeking to legitimize 
their own dominant status within existing structures of social inequality. (2003: 18) 
There is no doubt that such interventions in the accounting for stigma are productive. The 
analysis we conduct here, however, establishes a different emphasis and thus a different 
account. In brief, our approach aims to rely less heavily upon the sovereign agency 
sometimes privileged in Parker and Aggleton’s diagnosis of the emergence and perpetuation 
of stigma. Instead it emphasises the mutual co-production of power and subjectivity, placing 
stigma into a performative ontological framework more attentive to the socially constitutive 
role of such phenomena and, we think, allowing useful insights into stigma’s ubiquity and 
persistence. We turn to Judith Butler’s philosophical resources on performativity here, finding 
in it tools for re-posing stigma as a performative biopolitical technology of power, one that 
constitutes the very conditions under which legitimate subjects emerge. In what follows we 
begin to raise questions about the biopolitical functions and operations of stigma, linking 




According to Erving Goffman (1973 [1963]), stigma exists where a personal attribute is 
viewed negatively in society, and where the affected individual is marked by that attribute in 
such a way that she or he is aware of the potential or actual negative judgements of others. 
In this sense the individual feels a sense of being either already ‘discredited’ by the attribute, 
or else potentially ‘discreditable’ in that negative judgement would follow the discovery by 
others of the attribute in question. In both cases, the individual is shaped by the sense of 
external judgment. As Goffman puts it, 
The stigmatized individual tends to hold the same beliefs about identity as we do: this 
is a pivotal fact … the standards he [sic] has incorporated from the wider society 
equip him to be intimately alive to what others see as his failing, inevitably causing 
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him, if only for moments, to agree that he does fall short of what he really ought to 
be. Shame becomes a central possibility… (Goffman, 1973 [1963]: 17-18) 
Goffman’s work has been used productively to examine a wide range of social issues, 
including, as we have seen, addiction (Fraser and Treloar, 2006; Neale, Nettleton and 
Pickering, 2011). It has also been adapted and refined, most notably by Graham Scambler 
who further conceptualises the distinction between ‘discreditable’ and ‘discredited’ identity in 
his influential study of epilepsy (1989). Here he offers two related concepts: ‘felt’ and 
‘enacted’ stigma, drawing a distinction between the expectation of negative judgement, and 
the direct experience of negative judgement. This distinction allows Scambler to 
acknowledge the unique, sometimes powerful, negative effects of maintaining silence 
around an attribute that may be expected to attract stigmatisation (1989: 57). Indeed, where 
silence is maintained, the possibility of encountering non-stigmatising, accepting responses 
from others is lost.  
 
In this respect, and also simply because stigma emerges out of the relationship between 
‘normality’ and otherness, stigma should, Goffman says, be articulated through a language 
of relationships, not only of attributes (1973 [1963]: 13). Here he is pointing to the sense in 
which attributes are not discrediting in themselves: they are only discrediting as a result of 
the socially produced meanings attached to those attributes. According to Goffman (1973 
[1963]: 14), there are three types of stigma or ‘undesired difference’ that distinguish 
individuals from the ‘normals’: 
1. ‘abominations of the body’, e.g. deformities 
2. ‘blemishes of individual character’ and; 
3. ‘tribal stigma of race, nation and religion’  
What are the implications of these differences? As Goffman puts it (1973 [1963]: 15), 
By definition, of course, we believe the person with a stigma is not quite human [...] 
We construct a stigma theory, an ideology to explain his inferiority and account for 
the danger he represents, sometimes rationalizing an animosity based on other 
differences such as social class.  
The account Goffman offers here fits neatly with addiction. The ‘addict’ is not quite human. 
She or he may be marked by all three of Goffman’s differences: the intoxicated or dependent 
body is an abomination – the product of a weak will, belonging to a tribal underclass of 
deviant and damaged souls. Discrimination follows the recognition of difference, as does a 
theory to justify the discrimination. Where the addict’s response is ‘defensive’ (resistant, 
angry or dismissive), this is simply treated as ‘a direct expression’ of the defect itself, further 




The stigmatised respond in various ways, managing and confronting the processes by which 
they are marginalised and othered in their encounters with the ‘normals’. According to 
Goffman, the main focus of his book is this encounter. While Goffman makes a point of 
framing stigma as a social process based on relationships, a key characteristic of the book is 
its emphasis on affected individuals and on questions of how stigma impacts on them, how 
they cope and how they relate to others (1973 [1963]: 151). This is of course an important 
approach because it emphasises the agency and subjecthood of those affected by stigma. 
As a result of it, however, Goffman pays little attention to questions of why particular features 
or issues come to be stigmatised, or what is achieved at a political level by stigmatisation.  
 
It could be argued that the absence of an analysis of the production of stigma has a kind of 
naturalising effect. By this we mean that it tends to present stigma as inevitable, the result of 
the intrinsic need for sameness within societies. As Goffman puts it, the management of 
stigma is ‘a general feature of society, a process occurring wherever there are identity 
norms’ (1973 [1963]: 155). He goes on to express the view that, ‘the role of the normal and 
the role of the stigmatized are parts of the same complex’ (1973 [1963]: 155). It is difficult to 
greet this assessment as anything but concerning. While it would perhaps be naïve to ask 
for a world in which difference goes unremarked and we all live in an atmosphere of kindly 
and frictionless mutual acceptance, the severity of some kinds of stigma means merely 
accepting this dynamic as inevitable and ubiquitous is not a viable ethical response. The 
stigmatisation of drug use and addiction finds extreme expression especially in legal 
contexts, where policing and incarceration are key elements, and where it supplies the logic 
for the execution of drug smugglers (China, Indonesia, Iran, Malaysia, Saudi Arabia, 
Singapore, Vietnam) and even extrajudicial killings with impunity (most notably in recent 
times, the Philippines). Such events render resignation to the inevitability of stigmatising 
reflexes impossible. Instead they prompt urgent questions about difference, the need to 
reconsider current judgements about drug use and addiction and, to put the issue simply, 
our ability to live with difference and the Other. This question of otherness, its place in 
workable societies, its meaning and how it is engaged, is an extremely pressing one, and 
may indeed require sustained theoretical and empirical attention if progress towards greater 
understanding is to be made (see also [omitted, forthcoming]; Weinberg, 2005).  
 
Some of Goffman’s observations do point towards a broader political way of understanding 
stigma processes that might be built upon in relation to drug use and addiction. For example, 
he notes towards the end of the book that: 
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the perceived undesirability of a particular personal property…has a history of its 
own, a history that is regularly changed by purposeful social action. (1973 [1963]: 
164-5) 
The same could indeed be said for addiction, which as many have noted emerged in the 18th 
and 19th centuries, has played out via varying explanatory frameworks since then and 
remains controversial. It is in this sense, in the resilience and persistence of addiction 
stigma, even as its terms and terrain shift over time, that a different account of stigmatisation 
and its functions is invited. 
 
Taking up a theoretical trajectory that postdates Goffman’s valuable work, in particular Judith 
Butler’s performative ontology, we re-pose stigma as a biopolitical technology of the social: a 
performative process that operates in the service of normative social relations. If we turn to 
Butler’s account of sex in her book Bodies that Matter (1993), we find tools of considerable 
value for our analysis. So, for example, Butler (1993: 2) makes clear the productive role of 
simultaneously limiting phenomena such as binarised biological sex: 
‘Sex’ is, thus, not simply what one has, or a static description of what one is: it will be 
one of the norms by which the ‘one’ becomes viable at all, that which qualifies a body 
for life within the domain of cultural intelligibility.  
Further, she explains that (1993: 3), ‘the subject, the speaking “I”, is formed by virtue of 
having gone through such a process of assuming a sex’. Spelling out the dynamic under 
consideration here, she adds: 
the subject is formed through the force of exclusion and abjection, one which 
produces a constitutive outside to the subject, an abjected outside, which is, after all, 
‘inside’ the subject as its own founding repudiation (1993: 3).  
In these statements Butler is pointing to the necessary role the adoption of a recognisable 
sexed identity plays in the admittance of each subject into ordinary social life. Importantly, 
Butler’s book also offers a critique of just how the standard binary model of sex is constituted 
(through the circulation of gender discourse), thereby ensuring her account is not an 
essentialising one. We have a similar task to perform here. If the subject only becomes 
viable through its accession into the realm of binary sex and the proclamation of 
conventional sex/gender alignment (my body is female and I am a woman), a similar process 
operates in relation to the accession into autonomous, sober, free and rational subjecthood. 
In Butler’s analysis, the outside of legitimacy comprises all those whose sex, gender and 
sexuality do not align in normative ways. In our analysis, the outside of legitimacy comprises 
all those whose relationship to drugs does not align with normative understandings of 




Linking Butler’s account of the constitutive outside to Goffman’s observation that ‘the role of 
the normal and the role of the stigmatized are parts of the same complex’ we can argue that 
stigma is more than a misunderstanding or deficit of knowledge or feeling to be solved or 
supplemented. It is a process of social production. Stigma, that is, is not simply a thing, a 
mark, nor is it even just a relationship. It is not just a local or intra-psychic process where 
individuals form ‘in-groups’ and ‘out-groups’ (Simmonds and Coomber, 2009). It is a 
biopolitical technology of power that allows certain subjects legitimacy and not others, and 
further, constitutes the conditions under which legitimate subjects emerge. This is perhaps 
why it is not readily or enduringly dismantled by ‘education’, however well-meaning, why it 
inheres even in institutions such as healthcare. It is a founding process of social production, 
and the particular issues through which it operates in any given society (binary sex, sobriety) 
tell us much about the unexamined self-image of that society, and the many other related 
phenomena on which that self-image relies. It could be, for example, that the figure of the 
irrational addict forms one of the last remaining consensus Others to the now beleaguered 
‘modern interlude’ in which Enlightenment notions of rationality, objectivity and transparent 
reality hold sway (Fraser, Moore and Keane, 2014; Keane, 2002; Latour, 2010; Sedgwick, 
1993). 
 
In what follows we examine the accounts of stigma provided in our interviews, considering 
them in light of Goffman’s observations about stigma and Butler’s insights into the political 
productivity of abjection. In doing so, our approach to abjection focusses on its socially 
performative operations. In this respect its emphasis is rather different from other important 
approaches to abjection, such as Julia Kristeva’s profoundly influential work (1982) which 
foregrounds explicitly emotional dimensions of shame, horror and repulsion. All these 
dimensions also operate in the abjection discussed here (they are of course in part what give 
it its force, and both Butler and Kristeva operate on psychoanalytic theoretical terrain), but 
our main concerns are liberal social processes and political effects. 
 
Method 
The qualitative research project on which this article is based was designed to gather 
personal accounts for presentation on a web-based resource on addiction experiences 
(www.livesofsubstance.org). The project is a collaboration with Healthtalk Australia 
(http://healthtalkaustralia.org), a research consortium that conducts qualitative research into 
personal experiences of health and illness. Healthtalk Australia collaborative projects use a 
qualitative methodology developed by Oxford University’s Health Experiences Research 
Group (HERG, 2010). Following this methodology, in-depth qualitative interviews were 
conducted with 60 people who responded to a recruitment flyer that opened with the 
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question: ‘Do you consider yourself to have a drug habit, dependence or addiction?’ The 
flyer was circulated through alcohol and other drug sector newsletters, treatment services, 
and peer advocacy organisations. Those who responded were screened to ensure range in 
gender, age, drug type(s), and treatment experiences. All described ongoing (n=47) or past 
(n=13) regular use of a range of licit and illicit drugs including alcohol, cannabis, crystal 
methamphetamine, heroin and benzodiazepines. Demographic details are presented in 
Appendix 1.  
 
Interviews took place during 2014 and 2015 in urban and regional Victoria and New South 
Wales, Australia. Following an open-ended invitation to ‘tell us their story’, participants were 
asked about their experiences of living with an alcohol or other drug habit, dependence or 
addiction, including consumption in daily life, managing relationships, health and well-being 
and future plans. All interviews were conducted in person (by authors [omitted] and project 
staff) and were audio-recorded and transcribed. To protect participant identities, each was 
given a pseudonym and all identifying details were removed from the transcripts. The 
interviews were then analysed using an iterative inductive approach in which a preliminary 
list of codes was drawn up based on themes emerging from the data, as well as the 
literature and knowledge of key debates. The data were then coded with the aid of the NVivo 
qualitative data management software.  
 
This study was approved by [omitted] University’s Human Research Ethics Committee (HR 




As we have noted, many participants described experiences of addiction-related 
stigmatisation. They talked at length about the impact of stigma on their everyday lives, 
including how it shapes their experiences of healthcare, their relationships with family, 
friends and their work. The sections that follow break up kinds of stigma according to context 
to allow us to focus on the variety of settings within which participants describe encountering 
stigma. Importantly, however, such experiences overlap for many, forming not individual 
islands of discomfort or abuse, but the very fabric of everyday life. 
 
The healthcare system 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, given the extensive literature documenting the persistence of stigma 
within the health system (e.g. Anstice et al., 2009; Henderson et al., 2008), this is one of the 
most commonly cited contexts participants describe as stigmatising, including those contexts 
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offering harm reduction services. Some participants describe experiences when they felt 
healthcare professionals treated them differently from other patients, with several 
commenting that they feel like staff ‘look down on’ them. As David (M, 25, unemployed, 
heroin) explains in relation to his experience of filling his methadone prescription:  
Just at the chemist, I feel like they are looking down on us. They don’t treat us [like] a 
normal patient. Like, we’d go in there for a prescription [and we] are always second 
best. Like [the staff will] push you to the side or push you back, and deal with their 
people first and then deal with the ‘druggies’. That’s what we look like [to them].  
Here David is describing what Scambler (1989) calls enacted stigma. Similarly, Dean (M, 35, 
works in hospitality, methamphetamine) says he has been refused service at chemists when 
trying to access sterile injecting equipment.  
 Getting needles when you need them is a hard deal […] Even going to chemists and 
asking them, they’re like, ‘No, no […] we don’t have them’ […] I just sort of wanted to 
get out of there [after being told that] because I felt about this [small]. So yeah, I went 
to a few different ones. One big one that I knew stocked them around here, and they 
said, ‘No’ as well, and I was just like, ‘Okay’.  
Like David, Dean describes enacted stigma, but he also goes on to spell out the shame this 
stigmatising process generates for him, the sense in which the stigmatising process 
instigated a particular sense of self, and particular experiences of ‘felt stigma’ (Scambler, 
1989: 57).  
 
In addition, several participants say they found it hard to get medication for pain relief 
because of their medical histories of alcohol and other drug dependence. For example, when 
George (M, 58, not working due to illness, alcohol) was injured, he says he was denied 
adequate pain medication due to his ‘history of drug use’. 
 I’d actually been attacked and had fractured my back and they sent me out of the 
hospital with Panadeine [paracetamol and low-dose codeine]. I couldn’t even get 
[Panadeine] Forte [paracetamol and higher-dose codeine] because they knew I had a 
past history of drug use. So they wouldn’t give me anything stronger than Panadeine. 
I mean it’s ridiculous. I had a fractured back. 
Similarly, Zadie (F, 33, works in the health sector, heroin) describes being refused treatment 
for a health condition because, she says, the doctors ‘assumed [she] was just trying to scam 
some opiates’. Commenting on being denied pain medication, she says,  
[If] you treat people like this, you leave them with little […] option other than to do 
what they can to deal with that pain. And certainly, it was easier to go and score 
some illicit drugs to deal with it. What else was I going to do? 
Zadie’s experience of hospital care after an accidental overdose is especially striking: 
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I was unconscious and I came to in the hospital […] I became conscious but I 
couldn’t move a muscle […] I could feel pain but I couldn’t move, and I could hear 
what the doctors and the paramedics were saying about me [which was] just really 
derogatory, you know: ‘Stupid fucking junkie, [we] get them all the time’. It upsets me 
even thinking about it [crying]. They were being very, very rough with my body. There 
was no care. 
 
Past experiences of stigma and discrimination in the health system mean that some of our 
participants are hesitant to discuss their alcohol or other drug consumption with health 
professionals, or access healthcare. This has several important implications. Most 
concretely, it can mean that people seek medical help belatedly by which stage initially minor 
health problems may have become more serious and difficult to treat. More abstractly, this 
process of generating avoidance and even shame operates to exclude and render abject the 
drug using subject, producing invisibility, constituting the normal health subject by erasing 
the undesirable. Following Goffman, the extracts above suggest that people who consume 
drugs routinely enter healthcare settings keenly aware of their ‘discreditable’ identities, 
already subjects of felt stigma, and all too often of enacted stigma. How can felt and enacted 
stigma be reliably separated here? We would argue they cannot, and that, in keeping with 
the performative approach to stigma outlined earlier, wherever felt stigma is facilitated, this 
facilitation needs to be understood as a form of enactment. Here we begin to view Goffman’s 
stigma, and the abjection Butler elucidates, more as a systemic process, one that constitutes 
legitimacy and abjection at once, a process that cannot it seems establish intelligibility and 
belonging without also establishing unintelligibility and exclusion. 
 
The workplace 
Another key area in which participants describe stigma is employment and the workplace 
(other research illuminating this issue includes van Olphen et al., 2009; Baldwin et al., 2010; 
Earnshaw et al., 2013). Some say they decided not to disclose their drug consumption to 
their employers because they were concerned they would be judged and lose their jobs. As 
Jenna (F, 31, cannabis, studying) puts it, ‘I don’t think people judge based on performance 
[…] If they think you’re [a drug] user, then […] the judgment is made that you are not 
employable’. Dean (M, 35, works in hospitality, methamphetamine) says that if colleagues 
noticed injecting track marks on his arms, they would assume he has a ‘problem’.  
 But yeah, I think every [workplace has a…] lot more of a sort of relaxed feel when it 
comes to alcohol. But when you go to work with track marks, you don’t even 
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necessarily have to be using at work, or under the influence […but] there’s just this 
thing that you’ve got a problem […so] most of the time [I wear long sleeves at work]. 
Here Dean again describes the work individuals do to manage ‘discreditability’, but we can 
also consider his words from the position being developed in this article, that of the process 
of stigmatisation, the constitution of the ‘normal’ – the re-enactment of alcohol consumption 
and all that goes with it as normal – precisely through the abjection of other kinds of 
consumption. 
  
Some of those interviewed were recipients of opioid pharmacotherapy treatment, and 
described particular challenges relating to managing employment and participation in this 
form of treatment. A few described avoiding telling their employers that they were having 
treatment for fear of being judged or even losing their jobs, even though limited dispensing 
hours meant difficulties accessing dosing. As David (M, 25, unemployed, heroin) explains: 
 [I never talked to my boss about going to the chemist…] I just didn’t want him looking 
at me as a druggie […] I always had to [get my methadone dose] before work or after 
work. And with getting there on time and just a lot of hassle just to make it to the 
chemist, I thought to myself, it’s not worth [trying to get my dose during work hours. If 
I told my boss he would] just look at me different and I know I’m better than that […I 
was] scared to get sacked or discriminated against.  
David’s account makes clear the threat of discreditability that shapes many participants’ 
lives, and in particular the role this threat plays in creating workplaces putatively untouched 
by illicit drug use. It also suggests, as the previous section indicates, that despite its 
supposedly non-judgmental approach based in medicine’s aim to cure or alleviate disease, 
the healthcare framework posited by ‘treatment’ does not necessarily resolve the potential 
for stigmatisation. Here again we see addiction stigma operating as a biopolitical technology 
allowing certain subjects legitimacy and not others, discrediting the drug using subject as 
incapable and ‘unemployable’, and rendering disclosure unthinkable. As we saw in the 
context of the health system, one effect of this is that it renders the drug using subject 
invisible in the workplace, reinforcing the idea that drug use and productive work are 
inimical. 
 
The criminal justice system 
Experiences of stigma in the criminal justice system are also described by participants (see 
also Radcliffe and Stevens, 2008). Some describe experiences in which police officers, 
lawyers or judges expressed negative attitudes towards them or treated them unfairly. Some 
point out that the criminalisation of drugs contributes to the stigma surrounding them. As Jim 
(M, 21, studying, cannabis) explains,  
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I think if [cannabis] was legal, there wouldn’t be this whole stigma around it. And, like, 
the anxiety and stuff that comes when people are high, I think, is based around the 
fact that you have done something wrong now and you can get in trouble. 
Jim’s comment is important for the position we advance in this article. As he notes, the 
relationship between stigma and institutional and legal arrangements should not be ignored. 
Measures that treat stigma as a fundamentally individual phenomenon that can be tackled 
through education and interaction with stigmatised individuals not only ignore its institutional 
dimension, but actively obscure and naturalise it, potentially ushering in abuses of power (as 
the next example suggests). Peter (M, 41, unemployed, heroin) describes the stigma of track 
marks and the related sense of being unfairly targeted by police. He reports being strip 
searched on one occasion because police suspected he was carrying illicit drugs: 
 As soon as the police see […track marks on forearm], just, they know and they do 
treat you different. They treat you with such little respect. I’ve had them drag me into 
an alley before and fully strip search me in an alley, just because they thought I had 
drugs on me. They thought I was dealing, and I had nothing on me. And anyone 
could’ve walked down that alley. And just little things like that, and your lack of dignity 
really. They really do take [that] away from you. 
Peter characterises being publicly strip searched as a ‘little thing’, yet he also says 
encounters of this kind deprive him of his dignity. Misja (M, 40, not working due to illness, 
cannabis and heroin) too says the police are very judgmental about people with addictions 
and often search them for no reason. 
 If you get pulled over in my area, the first thing [the police] say is, ‘What are you 
doing in this area? It’s a known drug area. Why are you here?’ […They think] just 
because someone’s a drug addict, they’ve got to be up to no good. And I don’t find 
that right at all because, like, I’m a drug addict, and I don’t cause any trouble any 
more and I don’t want to cause any trouble for anyone. But yeah, I just don’t like how 
they are so judgmental, and they actually taunt [you]. Yeah, when they pull you over 
and they try to pin you for something, they’ve got to search you [...] To be pulled over 
in public and searched for no reason at all, just because you are walking down the 
street, that’s not right. 
 
Some participants focus on other aspects of the criminal justice system, including legal 
processes. When Dawn (F, 38, works in manufacturing, alcohol) was facing assault charges 
and hoped to access an alcohol treatment service, she felt that her lawyer condemned her 
as merely a ‘drunk’. 
The guy that represented me […] I really felt that he was judging me for what I’d 
done. He was also a lawyer for kids and so when he was representing me, maybe I 
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just felt that he […] really felt that I didn’t deserve to go to rehab […] I really felt that 
he thought that I should just be thrown into jail and I was a drunk.  
While individualised education might appear to be a logical response to stigmatising and 
discriminatory approaches, examples of this kind suggest otherwise. First, the nature of 
stigma as a process means potential targets such as Dawn are understandably primed for 
negative judgements. Tackling the issue piecemeal by educating relevant service providers 
is unlikely to produce the sea change that would alter Dawn’s expectations, that is, her 
experientially based sense of felt stigma. Second, it is difficult to argue that highly trained 
professionals such as lawyers do not already have sufficient access to information about 
drug use, or the skills and obligation to find it. It is also difficult to argue that what is missing 
is direct contact with members of the stigmatised group. Dawn’s personal history includes 
experiencing violence at the hands of the father of her eldest daughter, anxiety and 
depression, relationship breakup and the teenage pregnancy of her daughter. All these 
aspects of her life were available to her lawyer. Whether he did indeed judge Dawn as 
harshly as she believed (and her perceptions in themselves tell us much about the 
operations of stigma), it seems unlikely given her comments that he actively attempted to 
relieve her very predictable fears. 
 
The media 
Another key area of addiction stigma discussed by our study participants was the media (see 
also Cape, 2003; Fraser, 2006; Swalve and DeFoster, 2016). Several point out that media 
coverage can be sensationalist, exaggerating the harms of drugs and contributing to 
misinformation and damaging stereotypes. A few say they avoid news media reports on drug 
use for this reason. As Scott (M, 25, studying and working in hospitality, alcohol) puts it: 
You open The Herald Sun or even The Age [newspapers, the latter a respected 
broadsheet], like, I don’t even bother. I just don’t read it, or it just goes in one ear and 
out the other […] because [the media presents] like such an extreme view of these 
people, like me and my friends [who take drugs]. 
Harry (M, 52, works in the arts, heroin) offers a specific example of how the media reinforces 
stigma by presenting inaccurate information and negative stereotypes about drug 
consumption. 
 […According to the media] everyone falls into this category [of being addicted] 
They’re the junkie, you know, they’re the useless person on the street, they’re the 
bottom feeders, you know […] It’s not questioned in the mainstream media and that’s 
the unfortunate thing […that there is] that level of stigma [in the media]. 
According to Artemis (M, 28, works in education, party drugs) media coverage of crystal 
methamphetamine consumption in particular exaggerates rates of ‘problematic use’, failing 
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to acknowledge that many use it without developing problems. This, he says, reinforces the 
stigma surrounding it.  
Certainly in the media, addiction is the only discourse when it comes to drug use. I 
mean, we have to only look to the recent coverage of crystal meth use to like shake 
our heads and wonder, you know. Everyone is addicted to crystal meth, I take it. Not 
that crystal meth isn’t very addictive and problematic for some people, there’s no 
question about that, but […] there are [many more] who use without issue […] In 
terms of addiction, I mean it’s stigmatising. 
Others talk directly about how stigmatising media reports impact on their everyday lives. For 
example, Nick (M, 50, not working due to illness, heroin) says that news reports reinforce 
negative attitudes, and he believes this has affected his relationships:  
[Living with a drug habit] you lose contact with friends […] Friends that can help […] 
are no longer around […] because I think […] they read the paper and the news, and 
they see crimes committed by people to get drugs. They put me in that category, I 
suppose. 
 
As with the healthcare system and the criminal justice system, the media are understood by 
participants to be key agents in the stigmatisation of drug use and of people engaged in it. 
Rather different here, however, is the degree of personal connection with the stigmatising 
process. In the previous sections participants described very direct experiences of stigma 
based on contact with individuals who address them personally. In the context of media 
discourse, the biopolitical effect is more indirect and general, but no less significant. In these 
cases individuals are not personally addressed, but are nonetheless acutely aware of the 
impact the media have on how their lives are understood and valued, and how normalisation 
and abjection are produced. 
 
Family and friends 
Some participants’ most painful experiences of stigma are described as occurring within 
family and friendship networks (see also Earnshaw et al., 2013). One participant, Nick (M, 
50, not working due to illness, heroin), says his family discriminate against him because of 
his heroin consumption and this causes him pain. 
The relatives didn’t want their kids associating with me any more – my cousins – 
even though I didn’t encourage them to take drugs or anything of the kind. Yeah, that 
hurt a bit [...] It had a big impact. [...] They don’t trust me. And they think that a user is 
a junkie, a stereotypical junkie that’ll steal from anybody. 
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Similarly, Bobby (M, 49, not working due to illness, heroin and alcohol) explains that his 
mother judges him for taking drugs and refuses to let him stay with her when he visits from 
out of town. 
 I can sense the discrimination from my own mother. Like, last time when I had my 
accident, I went [interstate to visit her. At the time she was] in hospital. So I got all the 
way [there] and […] I’m her son and I needed somewhere to sleep, and my own 
mother doesn’t want me to sleep at her place. That says a hell of a lot. That means 
my mother has written me off […] I’ve even told her like, ‘There are no drugs’ and 
everything, but her actions speak louder. So you can lose your own mother because 
she has got preconceptions about drug use.  
Stigma and discrimination lead some participants to avoid disclosing their drug use to family 
and friends. For example, echoing Goffman’s observations about the status of the 
stigmatised as not quite human, Harry (M, 52, works in the arts, heroin) says,  
Because of [heroin’s] prohibition and [the fact] that it’s stigmatised, you can’t admit to 
people around you, even sometimes close friends, that you might use that drug. 
Because they will think you’re a […] ‘junkie’, which […] basically frames you as being 
something less than human or less than normal.  
 
Perhaps most importantly of all, along with all these specific descriptions of cases or 
instances of stigma – in healthcare, the criminal justice system, personal relationships and 
so on – it is essential to note that some participants describe experiences of many different 
kinds of stigma. For example, during the course of his interview Harry describes 
encountering stigma in his workplace, the healthcare system, the media and his extended 
family. While our interview method encouraged participants to speak freely about their 
experiences, the effect was largely to elicit examples. Harry’s comments, when taken 
together, are a reminder of how persistent, widespread and endemic such stigmatisation can 
be. Indeed, this article’s approach to stigma – treating it as a biopolitical technology of power 
– prompts us to see it as a broad process, unlikely to inhere only in one or another 
encounter or situation. 
 
Challenging stigma and discrimination 
Importantly, some of our participants say they prefer to talk openly about their drug use in an 
effort to overcome shame and challenge negative stereotypes. As Jim (M, 21, studying, 
cannabis) says, ‘I suppose I am already labelled as a drug user and I don’t deny it. I tell 
people I use drugs […] so I’m not really scared of that stigma at all’. Related to this, some 
people criticise the idea of addiction or dependence, saying it implies illness and suffering. 
Challenging this view, they describe regular consumption as an important part of, rather than 
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a threat to, their rich and fulfilling lives. Indeed, some argue that stigma actively causes drug-
related harm by turning drug use into the source of shame and a sense of failure and 
illegitimacy. Kate (F, 36, works in the health sector, prescription drugs and 
methamphetamine) links these processes to prohibition, its exclusionary action and its 
automatic creation of criminals: 
 Branding someone an addict, it’s like they’re not part of the community any more, 
they are a criminal, they’re like not someone you’d want in your home or in your life 
or around your kids. And yeah, there’s that really big separation […] Then you are 
[thinking] ‘well it’s an addiction, I have a problem and I need to seek help’, and then if 
you don’t seek help it’s like, ‘I’m not seeking help for my addiction, so I am a bad 
person’ or ‘I’m not living my life responsibly, I’m not contributing to the community, 
I’m not this and I’m not that’. And I mean all that comes back to prohibition. 
 
The relation between criminalisation of drug use and the performative enactment of people 
who use drugs and ‘addicts’ as irresponsible failed citizens can be seen as a key part of the 
stigmatisation process and its function as a biopolitical technology of power. Of course, 
alcohol does not fit neatly into Kate’s account in that it is not subject to prohibition. But as 
Dean’s earlier comments about the status of drinking versus injecting drug use suggests, 
alcohol consumption is viewed very differently from illicit drug use and, while also 
stigmatised, ‘alcoholism’ tends to be identified by markers and thresholds that also differ 
significantly from illicit drugs. This reminds us, as do the varied accounts in previous sections 
of this analysis, that the operations of stigma are contingent on a range of other processes 
and phenomena, including the legal status of different drugs, the ‘diseasing’ of addiction, the 
governing ideal of free will and the related assumption that drug use constitutes a threat to 
the proper rational, choosing subject.  
 
Conclusions 
In the analysis presented here we have spelt out the many experiences of stigma reported 
by the participants in our study. In doing so we have highlighted the persistence of addiction 
stigma in a context where disease models, most influentially right now the brain disease 
model, ought if expectations are correct to be reducing such experiences, and we have 
raised the need for new approaches that better understand the role of stigma. In response to 
this need we have elaborated the performative dimensions of stigma, the ways in which it 
enacts certain abject subjectivities, sensations and material expressions of exclusion. Given 
the continuing ubiquity of addiction stigma despite efforts to reduce it by presenting addiction 
as a disease, we are obliged to consider whether such attempts to destigmatise it may be 
naïve. It may be that it is more productive to ask what this stigmatisation achieves, given its 
20 
 
place in the seemingly unremitting engine of modernity. If ‘the role of the normal and the role 
of the stigmatized are parts of the same complex’ (Goffman 1973 [1963]: 155), what is the 
‘complex’, how cohesive is it, and how might it be interrogated and undermined? To pursue 
these questions we must consider addiction not so much as a stigmatised state but as a 
linguistic and taxonomical mechanism by which stigma is materialised. This, we would 
argue, includes the medicalised terminology of ‘dependence’ and ‘substance use disorder’. 
From this point of view, addiction should not be reified as a fixed attribute that attracts 
stigma, one that, as Nora Volkow has argued, can be destigmatised if only we see that it is a 
sickness of the brain characterised by a ‘diseased’ ‘free will’ (2015), or even as essentially a 
problem ruthlessly mobilised in the ‘service of power’ (Parker and Aggleton, 2003). Instead it 
is a biopolitical designation at the centre of a profound process in which a constitutive 
outside of irrationality and dependence emerges to consolidate the modernist centre of 
rationality and autonomy (Sedgwick, 1993). In practical terms, that is, addiction is a means 
by which contemporary liberal subjects are schooled and disciplined in the forms of conduct 
and dispositions required to belong, and to count as fully human. Thus, while for some the 
designation ‘disease’ offers those affected access to compassion and a kind of 
destigmatisation, another perspective suggests it merely entrenches stigma by rendering 
people both sick and not competent to ‘speak back’ against this rendering. Moreover, in 
cases where people who use drugs try to comply with liberal expectations such as the 
responsible use of sterile injecting equipment but are turned away at chemists, or 
participation in paid employment but cannot access treatment dosing at suitable times, their 
abjection is doubled, and indeed somewhat circular. In many respects, then, the loss of 
legitimacy our participants report suffering cannot be remedied by disease concepts – 
indeed it may be magnified by them. 
 
Lest we conclude along the lines already questioned above – that stigmatisation is an 
inevitable or natural aspect of the production of cohesive societies – it is important to note 
that Butler also observes (1993: 3) that the abjection on which the subject is grounded 
always threatens to come to light, and that its consequences cannot be fully controlled. Her 
work highlights scenarios of gender disruption: of active sex/gender resistance, as well as 
the exposure of gender’s arbitrariness via ‘failed’ gender iterations. Similarly, our work 
highlights both the active resistance of people who use drugs to the stigma(tisation) of 
addiction, and the disruptions that occur through the inadvertent ‘failure’ to reiterate the 
supposedly fundamentally free ‘non-addicted’ subject. Such instances of disruption should 
not be seen merely as mistakes or as moments of misguided or doomed protest. As Butler 
says (1993: 3), 
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The task will be to consider this threat and disruption not as a permanent 
contestation of social norms condemned to the pathos of perpetual failure, but rather 
as a critical resource in the struggle to rearticulate the very terms of symbolic 
legitimacy and intelligibility. 
This indeed is our task too, if we genuinely wish to eradicate the stigma so consistently and 
movingly described by the participants in this study. Our aim must be to rearticulate the very 








Table: Data characteristics (N=60) 
 
^All participants identified either as male or female. 
* Some participants described consuming only one drug, while others talked about two or more. The 
table lists the drug that participants identified as their primary preferred drug. 
~ Reporting of cultural and ethnic background follows the Australian Standard Classification of 
Cultural and Ethnic Groups, developed by the Australian Bureau of Statistics. Cultural and ethnic 
background was classified according to a combination of self-reported group identification with 
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